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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DON A. ELTON, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
• . 
• . 
. ' 
. 
. 
. 
• . 
• . 
• . 
• 
• 
• . 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 18151 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by information with the crime of 
Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in violation of Section 76-5-401, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that he had sexual 
intercourse with one EVANNE COLLINGS, a female, not his wife, on 
the 16th day of September, 1981, at a time when said EVANNE 
COLLINGS was under sixteen (16) years of age and more than three 
(3) years younger than Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOW'ER COURT 
Appellant was tried in the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County, with the Honorable GEORGE E. BALLIF, Judge, 
presiding, on the 5th day of November, 1981, before a jury. 
Following the trial, the jury found the Appellant guilty as 
charged. Appellant was sentenced on the 4th day of December, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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1981, to complete a half-way house program in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. Notice of Appeal in this matter was filed in the Utah 
County Clerk's office on December 9, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
verdict and judgment and remand the case to the District Court 
for a new trial based upon the argument which follows. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 16, 1981, Appellant, his brother, and a friend, 
offered a ride to two young ladies. The group went to Payson, 
Utah, purchased some beer, and then went swimming at the warm 
springs in Santaquin Canyon. The group then went to Appellant's 
home in Payson, Utah, where the members of the group began 
drinking Tequilla. Appellant and one of the girls, EVANNE 
COLLINGS, then went into one of the bedrooms and had sexual 
irttercourse. Appellant later learned that MISS COLLINGS was only 
fourteen (14) years of age at the time, while he was nineteen 
(19) years of age. At the trial of this matter, Appellant 
attempted to introduce evidence to the effect that he believed 
MISS COLLINGS to be over the aqe of sixteen (16). The Court 
excluded all evidence pertaining to Appellant's belief and his 
reasons for believing MISS COLLINGS to be over the age of sixteen 
(16). Appellant requested a jury instruction to the effect 
-2-
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that reasonable belief that the victim is sixteen (16) years of 
age is a defense to the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse. 
The Court denied such request. At the conclusion of the trial 
the jury found Appellant guilty as charged. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CRIME OF UNLAWFUL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE REQUIRES 
A CULPABLE STATE OF MIND OR CRIMINAL INTENT. 
The Courts of the State of Utah have traditionally treated 
the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse as a strict liability 
crime, requiring proof only as to the fact of intercourse and the 
participants' ages. In recent years, other States have begun 
requiring proof of a culpable state of mind or criminal intent to 
sustain a conviction for a crime of this type. 
In general terms the criminal code of this State requires 
some union of criminal conduct and a criminal state of mind. 
Section 76-1-104, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides 
in part as follows: 
76-1-104. Purposes and Principals of Construction. -
The provisions of this Code shall be construed in 
accordance with these general purposes ... (2) 
Define adequately the conduct and mental state which 
constitute each offense and safeguard conduct that is 
without fault from condemnation as criminal. 
The necessity of proving a culpable mental state is not, 
however, required in crimes involving strict liability. Section 
-3-
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76-2-101, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides as 
follows: 
76-2-101. Requirements of Criminal Conduct and 
Criminal Responsibility. - No person is guilty 
of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by 
law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly 
or with criminal negligence with respect to each 
element of the offense as the definition of the 
offense requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving 
strict liability. 
Section 76-2-102, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; as amended, 
delineates when a crime involves strict liability. 
76-2-102. Culpable Mental State Required - Strict 
Liabilty. - Every offense not involving strict 
liabilty shall require a culpable mental state, and 
when the definition of the offense does not specify 
a culpable mental state, intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility. An offense shall involve strict 
liabilty only when the statute defining the offense 
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose 
strict liability for the conduct by use of the phrase 
"strict liability" or other terms of similar import. 
Since Section 76-5-401, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, does not use the phrase "strict liabiltiy", that crime 
can only be a strict liability crime if the statute "clearly 
indicates a legislative purpose to impose strict liabiltiy •..• " 
Appellant contends that Section 76-5-401, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, does not contain a clear indication of 
legislative purpose to impose strict liability, but, rather, 
-4-
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requires a culpable state of mind, as any other crime in this 
State. 
It would be ludicrous to suppose that the legislature 
intended the crime of unlawful sexual intercouse to be a strict 
liabilty crime. To impose strict liability for this crime, the 
legislature would have to make some basic assumptions relative to 
human behavior. One such assumption is that all girls over the 
age of sixteen (16) realize the implications of sexual 
relationships and no girl under the age of sixteen (16) realizes 
those implications. Another assumption is that all girls under 
-- -
the age of sixteen (16) are innocent and naive. Another 
assumption that all sexual activity is a man's fault. Appellant 
contends that a crime based strictly on the victim's age must 
include some culpable state of mind. There is a basic difference 
between physiological age, chronological age, mental age, and 
emotional age. 
If we follow the strict liabilty concept to its logical 
conclusion, some obviously unjust results occur. If consensual 
intercouse occurs one day prior to the girl's sixteenth (16th) 
birthday and the boy is nineteen (19), the conduct would be a 
third degree felony. The same conduct with the same state of 
mind and the same knowledge on behalf of the young man, occurring 
one day later, would be, at worst, Class B misdemeanor 
-5-
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fornication. But, how is the Defendant different? When does 
such conduct change from felony to misdemeanor? Is it midnight on 
the day of the girl's si~teenth (16th} birt~day? 12:01 o'clock 
A.M.? Sixteen (16) years, to the minute, following the girl's 
birth? It would be unjust and illogical to punish the boy more 
severely if it happens to be one day prior to the girl's 
sixteenth (16) birthday. The only way this crime can be just and 
logical is if it takes into consideration the Defendant's state 
of mind. 
Since the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse does not use 
the phrase "strict liability" and there is no clear legislative 
purpose to impose strict liability, a culpable mental state is an 
element which must be proven by the state. 
POINT II. 
MISTAKE OF FACT IS A DEFENSE TO THE CRIME OF 
UNLAWFUL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE. 
Section 76-2-304, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
provides in part as follows: 
76-2-304. Ignorance or Mistake of Fact or Law. -
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mis-
take of fact which disproves the culpable mental 
state is a defense to any prosecution for that 
• crime •.• 
If a Defendant in a crime of this type, through ignorance or 
mistake of fact, reasonably believes that the other participant 
-6-
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in the action is sixteen (16) years of age or older, he would not 
have the required culpable state of mind. 
In the California case of People vs. Hernandez, 61 Cal.2d 
529, 39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673, 8 A.L.R. 3d 1092 (1964), the 
California Court overturned prior cases and held that reasonable 
belief that the victim is over the statutory age is a defense 
to the crime of statutory rape or unlawful sexual intercourse. 
In California, at that time, the statutory age was eighteen 
(18). The girl involved in that case was three (3) months shy of 
eighteen (18} years. The procedure in that case closely 
parallels the procedure taken in the instant case. The 
Defendant, in that case, offered evidence, which was refused, 
relating to his belief that the girl was eighteen (18) years of 
age or older. Defendant was found guilty by the Court. He 
appealed that decision relying upon California Code Sections (1) 
requiring the union of action and intent to constitute a crime 
and (2) providing a defense for mistake of fact. While the 
entire decision in that case is supportive of Appellant's 
contentions herein, the following exerpts are felt to be most 
salient to the issues presented: 
An unwise disposition of her sexual favor is deemed 
to do harm both to herself and the social mores by 
which the community's conduct patterns are established. 
Hence the law of statutory rape intervenes in an 
effort to avoid such a disposition. This goal, more-
-7-
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over, is not accomplished by penalizing the naive 
female but by imposing criminal sanctions against the 
male, who is conclusively presumed to be responsible 
for the occurence. 
The assumption that age alone will bring an under-
standing of the sexual act to a young woman is of 
doubtful validity. Both learning from the cultural 
group to which she is a member and her actual sexual 
experiences will determine her level of comprehension. 
The sexually experienced 15-year old may be far more 
acutely aware of the implications of sexual inter-
course than her sheltered cousin who is beyond the 
age of consent. The girl who belongs to a group 
whose members indulge in sexual intercourse at an 
early age is likely to rapidly acquire an insight 
into the rewards and penalities of sexual indulgence. 
Nevertheless, even circumstances where a girl's 
actual comprehension contradicts the law's presumption, 
the male is deemed criminally responsibile for the 
act, although himself young and naive and responding 
to advances which may have been made to him. 
The law as presently constituted does not concern 
itself with the relative culpability of the male and 
female participants in the prohibited sexual act •.. 
However, the issue raised by the rejected offer of 
proof in the instant case goes to the culpability 
of the young man who acts without knowledge that an 
essential factual element exists and has, on the other 
hand, a positive, reasonable belief that it does not 
exist. 
The primordial concept of mens rea, the guilty mind, 
expresses the principal that it is not conduct alone 
but conduct accompanied by certain specific mental 
states which concerns, or should concern the law ••• 
More recently, however, this Court has moved away from 
the imposition of criminal sanctions in the absence 
of culpability where the governing statute, by 
implication or otherwise, expresses no legislative 
intent or policy to be served by imposing strict 
liabiltiy. 
* * * 
There can be no dispute that a criminal intent 
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ft'. 
exists when the perpetrator proceeds with utter 
disregard of, or in the lack of grounds for, a belief 
that the female has reached the age of consent. But if 
he participates in a mutual act of sexual intercouse, 
believing his partner to be beyond the age of consent, 
with reasonable grounds for such belief, where is his 
criminal intent? In such circumstances he has not 
consciously taken any risk. Instead he has sub-
jectively eliminated the risk by satisfying himself 
on reasonable evidence that the crime cannot be 
committed. If it occurs that he has been misled, 
we cannot realistically conclude that for such reason 
alone the intent with which he undertook the act 
suddenly becomes more heinous. 
* * * 
We hold only that in the absence of a legislative 
direction otherwise, a charge of statutory rape is 
defensible wherein a criminal intent is lacking. 
393 P.2d at 674-677. 
Appellant contends that the reasoning and logic of the 
Hernandez case apply to the case herein. A mistake of fact, 
i.e., a reasonable belief that the girl is sixteen (16) years of 
age or older, negates any culpable mental state or criminal 
intent in the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse, as in any 
other crime in this State. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE RELATING 
TO APPELLANT'S STATE OF MIND AND IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION. 
During the course of the trial in this matter, Appellant 
offered testimony from himself and other individuals to proove 
Appellant's belief that the victim was age sixteen (16) or 
-9-
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older. (Transcript page 36, lines 23 through 26; page 38, lines 
1 through 6; and page 38, lines 21 through 30.) The evidence was 
excluded on the basis that Appellant's state of mind was 
irrelevant to the crime charged. (Transcript page 36, lines 14 
through 22.) Appellant further requested the Court to instruct 
the jury to the effect that a reasonable belief on Appellant's 
part that the girl was age sixteen (16) or older is a defense to 
the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse. The requested jury 
instruction was not granted. 
As stated above, Appellant contends that reasonable belief 
that the girl was age sixteen (16) or older is a defense to the 
crime of unlawful sexual intercourse. Assuming that contention 
is approved by the Court, the evidence offered by Appellant 
should have been admitted and the requested jury instruction 
should have been given. If the jury had heard the evidence and 
received the requested jury instruction, they might have found 
the Defendant not guilty. 
CONCLUSION 
All crimes in the State of Utah require proof of a culoable 
state of mind or criminal intent, unless the particular statute 
uses the phrase "strict liability" or it "clearly indicates a 
legislative purpose to impose strict liability." 
The crime of unlawful sexual intercourse does not use the 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
phrase "strict liability" and does not contain a clear 
legislative purpose to impose strict liability, and, therefore, 
requires proof of a culpable state of mind or criminal intent. 
As with any other crime involving a culpable state of mind, 
the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse is subject to the 
defense of ignorance or mistake of fact. If the Defendant's 
ignorance or mistake of fact disproves the culpable mental state, 
then an essential element of the crime has not been proven. If 
the Defendant actually believed the victim to be age sixteen (16) 
or older, and his belief is found by the jury to be a reasonable 
belief, he should be acquitted. 
Appellant contends that he actually believed the victim to 
be age sixteen (16) or older and he attempted to explain to the 
jury why he believed she was age sixteen (16) or older. 
Appellant respectfully requests that the case be remanded to the 
District Court for a new trial to allow Appellant the opportunity 
to testify as to his reasons for believing MISS COLLINGS to be 
age sixteen (16) or older and that the jury be instructed that 
reasonable belief that the victim is age sixteen (16) or older is 
defense to the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse. 
Respectfully submitted this <./ :: day of March, 1982. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
KENT 0. WILLIS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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